In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology
(pp. 271-290). New York: Guilford, 1999.
 
On the Dialectics of Discrimination:
Dual Processes in Social Stereotyping
 
Galen V. Bodenhausen C. Neil Macrae Jeffrey W. Sherman
Northwestern University University of Bristol Northwestern University
 
SUMMARY
 

Over 35 years have passed since the historic moment when Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered his galvanizing speech entitled "I Have a Dream." In that speech, he expressed the hope that his children might "one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character." Explicit in this poignant comment is the assertion that there are two fundamentally different ways of judging others: either by relying on group-based assumptions, or by conducting an assessment of the personal qualities of each individual. This view has been at the heart of most social-psychological theories of stereotyping in social perception as well. For example, in the influential models of Brewer (1988) and Fiske and Neuberg (1990), a fundamental distinction is drawn between stereotyping and individuating or personalizing one's social impressions (see also Allport, 1954). In this chapter, we review the evidence for two qualitatively different pathways to social impressions, evaluate challenges to the validity of such distinctions, and consider how the dual-process models of stereotyping in social perception relate to other dual-process conceptualizations. We also consider in some detail other aspects of stereotyping that involve the interplay of two qualitatively different processes. The overall utility of a dual-process approach to stereotyping is then evaluated in light of these considerations.

 
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